FM / utils

/opt/imunify360/venv/versions/imunify-core-8.14.0-1/defence360agent/utils/

/opt/imunify360/venv/versions/imunify-core-8.14.0-1/defence360agent/utils

Name	Size	Mode	Actions
__pycache__/	-	0755	rm
antivirus_mode.py	497	0644	edit dl rm
async_utils.py	718	0644	edit dl rm
benchmark.py	538	0644	edit dl rm
buffer.py	1945	0644	edit dl rm
check_db.py	7988	0644	edit dl rm
check_lock.py	856	0644	edit dl rm
cli.py	9273	0644	edit dl rm
common.py	14757	0644	edit dl rm
completions.py	9988	0644	edit dl rm
config.py	1695	0644	edit dl rm
cronjob.py	902	0644	edit dl rm
doctor.py	5503	0644	edit dl rm
fd_ops.py	7573	0644	edit dl rm
hyperscan.py	149	0644	edit dl rm
importer.py	2722	0644	edit dl rm
ipecho.py	3247	0644	edit dl rm
json.py	953	0644	edit dl rm
kwconfig.py	1756	0644	edit dl rm
net.py	595	0644	edit dl rm
net_transport.py	16289	0644	edit dl rm
parsers.py	11879	0644	edit dl rm
resource_limits.py	5158	0644	edit dl rm
safe_fileops.py	13672	0644	edit dl rm
safe_sequence.py	363	0644	edit dl rm
serialization.py	2410	0644	edit dl rm
sshutil.py	15174	0644	edit dl rm
subprocess.py	1570	0644	edit dl rm
support.py	5329	0644	edit dl rm
tenant_path.py	4456	0644	edit dl rm
threads.py	1005	0644	edit dl rm
validate.py	4375	0644	edit dl rm
whmcs.py	7784	0644	edit dl rm
wordpress_mu_plugin.py	1440	0644	edit dl rm
zipsafe.py	720	0644	edit dl rm
_shutil.py	4019	0644	edit dl rm
__init__.py	69706	0644	edit dl rm

Edit: /opt/imunify360/venv/versions/imunify-core-8.14.0-1/defence360agent/utils/sshutil.py (15174B)

import asyncio
import datetime
import errno
import pwd
import re
import stat
import urllib.request
import os

from logging import getLogger
from urllib.error import URLError
from pathlib import Path

from defence360agent.utils import BACKUP_EXTENSION, atomic_rewrite
from defence360agent.utils.fd_ops import open_dir_no_symlinks

logger = getLogger(__name__)

ANALYST_PUB_KEY_URL = (
    "https://repo.imunify360.cloudlinux.com/defense360/assisted-cleanup.pub"
)
KEY_PATTERN = r"clsupport@sshbox\.cloudlinux\.com"
SSH_CONFIG_PATH = Path("/etc/ssh/sshd_config")
SSH_CONFIG_DIR = Path("/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d")

# \Z (not $) — $ would accept a trailing newline.
_USERNAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[a-z_][a-z0-9_-]{0,31}\Z")

def _resolve_authorized_keys(username: str) -> Path:
    """Home dir via pwd.getpwnam, not /home/ concatenation, to block path traversal."""
    if not isinstance(username, str) or not _USERNAME_RE.match(username):
        raise ValueError("invalid username: %r" % (username,))
    if username == "root":
        return Path("/root/.ssh/authorized_keys")
    try:
        home = pwd.getpwnam(username).pw_dir
    except KeyError as e:
        raise ValueError("no such user: %r" % (username,)) from e
    # pwd.pw_dir is normally absolute, but panel-driven user creation can
    # leave it empty or relative; refuse rather than write under CWD.
    if not home or not os.path.isabs(home):
        raise ValueError(
            "non-absolute home directory for %r: %r" % (username, home)
        )
    return Path(os.path.join(home, ".ssh", "authorized_keys"))

# The support pub key is shared across every Imunify install, so a leaked
# private counterpart would grant root on the whole fleet. Bound the blast
# radius via restrict + expiry-time options on the authorized_keys line.
DEFAULT_KEY_TTL_DAYS = 7
KEY_TTL_ENV_VAR = "IMUNIFY_ASSISTED_CLEANUP_KEY_TTL_DAYS"
KEY_OPTIONS_BASE = "restrict,pty"

async def get_ssh_port():
    """
    Detect SSH port from config and its overrides.
    Searches configs in reverse order to find the last override first.
    """
    port = 22  # default port
    try:
        # Collect and sort config files
        config_files = [SSH_CONFIG_PATH]

if SSH_CONFIG_DIR.exists():
            config_files.extend(sorted(SSH_CONFIG_DIR.glob("*.conf")))

# Process files
        for config_file in reversed(config_files):
            try:
                for line in config_file.read_text().splitlines():
                    line = line.strip()
                    if line.startswith("Port ") and not line.startswith("#"):
                        try:
                            # return first match
                            # since we are searching backwards
                            port = int(line.split()[1])
                            return port
                        except (IndexError, ValueError):
                            continue
            except IOError as e:
                logger.warning(f"Failed to read {config_file}: {e}")
                continue
    except Exception as e:
        logger.warning(f"Failed to get SSH port: {e}")
    finally:
        return port

async def check_ssh_connection(port=22):
    """Test if port is actually an SSH port by checking the server banner"""
    try:
        reader, writer = await asyncio.open_connection("127.0.0.1", port)
        try:
            banner = await asyncio.wait_for(reader.readline(), timeout=5.0)
            banner = banner.decode("utf-8", errors="ignore").strip()

if re.match(r"^SSH-[12]\.", banner):
                logger.info(
                    f"Port {port} is confirmed as SSH (banner: {banner})"
                )
                return True
            else:
                logger.warning(
                    f"Port {port} is open but not SSH (got: {banner})"
                )
                return False

except asyncio.TimeoutError:
            logger.warning(f"Timeout waiting for SSH banner on port {port}")
            return False
        finally:
            writer.close()
            await writer.wait_closed()

except (ConnectionRefusedError, OSError) as e:
        logger.warning(f"Failed to connect to port {port}: {e}")
        return False
    except Exception as e:
        logger.warning(f"Unexpected error checking SSH port {port}: {e}")
        return False

def _key_ttl_days() -> int:
    """Read the assisted-cleanup key TTL from env, falling back to default."""
    raw = os.environ.get(KEY_TTL_ENV_VAR, "")
    try:
        ttl = int(raw)
        if ttl > 0:
            return ttl
    except (TypeError, ValueError):
        pass
    return DEFAULT_KEY_TTL_DAYS

def _expiry_timestamp(now: "datetime.datetime | None" = None) -> str:
    # Bare timestamp (no Z): Z requires OpenSSH >= 9.1; without it sshd
    # parses as local time per authorized_keys(5), so convert before format.
    base = now or datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc)
    expiry = base.astimezone() + datetime.timedelta(days=_key_ttl_days())
    return expiry.strftime("%Y%m%d%H%M")

_OPENSSH_VERSION_RE = re.compile(r"OpenSSH_(\d+)\.(\d+)")

async def _sshd_supports_expiry_time() -> bool:
    # expiry-time keyword exists since OpenSSH 7.7; older sshd (CL7) rejects
    # the whole line. Probe failure -> False so we fall back to restrict,pty.
    try:
        proc = await asyncio.create_subprocess_exec(
            "ssh",
            "-V",
            stdout=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
            stderr=asyncio.subprocess.PIPE,
        )
        stdout, stderr = await asyncio.wait_for(proc.communicate(), timeout=5)
    except (OSError, asyncio.TimeoutError) as e:
        logger.warning("ssh -V probe failed: %s", e)
        return False
    output = (stderr or b"").decode("utf-8", errors="ignore") or (
        stdout or b""
    ).decode("utf-8", errors="ignore")
    match = _OPENSSH_VERSION_RE.search(output)
    if not match:
        logger.warning(
            "ssh -V did not match OpenSSH version pattern: %r", output[:200]
        )
        return False
    major, minor = int(match.group(1)), int(match.group(2))
    return (major, minor) >= (7, 7)

def build_authorized_key_line(pub_key: str, *, supports_expiry: bool) -> str:
    if supports_expiry:
        options = f'{KEY_OPTIONS_BASE},expiry-time="{_expiry_timestamp()}"'
    else:
        options = KEY_OPTIONS_BASE
    return f"{options} {pub_key.strip()}"

def _target_uid_gid(username: str):
    """Resolve uid/gid for the target user, or (None, None) when not applicable.

Returning ``(None, None)`` for root or unknown users lets
    ``atomic_rewrite`` skip its chown step and preserve the existing
    file's ownership.
    """
    if username == "root":
        return None, None
    try:
        pw = pwd.getpwnam(username)
    except KeyError:
        logger.warning(
            "user %r not found; leaving authorized_keys ownership untouched",
            username,
        )
        return None, None
    return pw.pw_uid, pw.pw_gid

def _open_ssh_dir(home_fd, uid, gid, *, create):
    """O_NOFOLLOW fd for .ssh under *home_fd*; a symlinked .ssh raises."""
    created = False
    if create:
        try:
            os.mkdir(".ssh", mode=0o700, dir_fd=home_fd)
            created = True
        except FileExistsError:
            pass
    ssh_fd = os.open(
        ".ssh",
        os.O_RDONLY | os.O_DIRECTORY | os.O_NOFOLLOW,
        dir_fd=home_fd,
    )
    if created:
        try:
            if uid is not None and gid is not None:
                os.chown(ssh_fd, uid, gid)
            os.fchmod(ssh_fd, 0o700)
        except BaseException:
            os.close(ssh_fd)
            raise
    return ssh_fd

async def install_pub_key(username="root"):
    # Idempotent: re-running rotates the expiry and replaces any legacy
    # (unguarded or older guarded) copy of the same key.
    try:
        try:
            auth_keys_path = _resolve_authorized_keys(username)
        except ValueError as e:
            logger.error("install_pub_key: %s", e)
            return False

# If not running as root, fail
        if os.geteuid() != 0:
            logger.error("Function must be run as root")
            return False

# Download the public key
        try:
            pub_key = (
                urllib.request.urlopen(ANALYST_PUB_KEY_URL)
                .read()
                .decode()
                .strip()
            )
        except URLError as e:
            logger.error(f"Failed to download public key: {e}")
            return False

# A genuine key is single-line; an embedded newline would split into
        # a second, option-less authorized_keys entry that bypasses restrict.
        if "\n" in pub_key or "\r" in pub_key:
            logger.error("Downloaded public key spans multiple lines")
            return False

guarded_line = build_authorized_key_line(
            pub_key,
            supports_expiry=await _sshd_supports_expiry_time(),
        )
        uid, gid = _target_uid_gid(username)

# Components above the user's home are root-controlled, so one
        # realpath is safe; everything below is opened with O_NOFOLLOW
        # and operated on dir_fd-relative, leaving no symlink-swap window.
        home = os.path.realpath(auth_keys_path.parent.parent)
        try:
            home_fd = open_dir_no_symlinks(home)
        except OSError as e:
            logger.error(f"Cannot open home directory {home}: {e}")
            return False
        try:
            try:
                ssh_fd = _open_ssh_dir(home_fd, uid, gid, create=True)
            except OSError as e:
                logger.error(
                    f"Failed to prepare directory {auth_keys_path.parent}: {e}"
                )
                return False
            try:
                permissions = None
                try:
                    keys_fd = os.open(
                        "authorized_keys",
                        os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW,
                        dir_fd=ssh_fd,
                    )
                except FileNotFoundError:
                    existing = ""
                    permissions = 0o600
                except OSError as e:
                    if e.errno != errno.ELOOP:
                        raise
                    logger.warning("Replacing symlinked %s", auth_keys_path)
                    existing = ""
                    permissions = 0o600
                else:
                    with os.fdopen(keys_fd, "r") as f:
                        existing = f.read()

# Strip any prior copy of the support key (legacy
                # unguarded or older guarded line) so re-running rotates
                # options + expiry instead of stacking duplicates.
                stripped = re.sub(
                    r".*" + KEY_PATTERN + r".*\n?",
                    "",
                    existing,
                )
                new_content = stripped
                if new_content and not new_content.endswith("\n"):
                    new_content += "\n"
                new_content += guarded_line + "\n"

atomic_rewrite(
                    "authorized_keys",
                    new_content,
                    backup=False,
                    uid=uid,
                    gid=gid,
                    permissions=permissions,
                    dir_fd=ssh_fd,
                )
            finally:
                os.close(ssh_fd)
        finally:
            os.close(home_fd)
        logger.info(
            "Installed assisted-cleanup key for user %s (%s)",
            username,
            guarded_line.split(" ", 1)[0],
        )
        return True
    except Exception as e:
        logger.error(f"Failed to install public key: {e}")
        return False

def remove_pub_key(username="root") -> bool:
    """Remove analyst public key for the specified user

This function removes the analyst's public key that was previously
    installed using the install_pub_key function.
    returns: True if key was successfully removed, False otherwise.
    """
    try:
        try:
            auth_keys_path = _resolve_authorized_keys(username)
        except ValueError as e:
            logger.error("remove_pub_key: %s", e)
            return False

uid, gid = _target_uid_gid(username)
        home = os.path.realpath(auth_keys_path.parent.parent)
        try:
            home_fd = open_dir_no_symlinks(home)
        except OSError as e:
            logger.warning(f"Cannot open home directory {home}: {e}")
            return False
        try:
            try:
                ssh_fd = _open_ssh_dir(home_fd, uid, gid, create=False)
            except OSError as e:
                logger.warning(
                    f"Cannot open directory {auth_keys_path.parent}: {e}"
                )
                return False
            try:
                try:
                    keys_fd = os.open(
                        "authorized_keys",
                        os.O_RDONLY | os.O_NOFOLLOW,
                        dir_fd=ssh_fd,
                    )
                except OSError as e:
                    logger.warning(f"Cannot open {auth_keys_path}: {e}")
                    return False
                with os.fdopen(keys_fd, "r") as f:
                    permissions = stat.S_IMODE(os.fstat(f.fileno()).st_mode)
                    content = f.read()

if not re.search(KEY_PATTERN, content):
                    logger.info(
                        f"Analyst public key not found in {auth_keys_path}"
                    )
                    return False

# Remove the key (including the line it's on)
                new_content = re.sub(
                    r".*" + KEY_PATTERN + r".*\n?", "", content
                )

if not new_content.strip():
                    logger.info(
                        f"File {auth_keys_path} will be empty after removal"
                    )

# atomic_rewrite's own backup mode is path-based and thus
                # symlink-unsafe; write the backup through the same pinned
                # descriptor instead.
                atomic_rewrite(
                    "authorized_keys" + BACKUP_EXTENSION,
                    content,
                    backup=False,
                    uid=uid,
                    gid=gid,
                    permissions=permissions,
                    dir_fd=ssh_fd,
                )
                atomic_rewrite(
                    "authorized_keys",
                    new_content,
                    backup=False,
                    uid=uid,
                    gid=gid,
                    dir_fd=ssh_fd,
                )
                logger.info(
                    "Successfully removed analyst public key from"
                    f" {auth_keys_path}"
                )
                return True
            finally:
                os.close(ssh_fd)
        finally:
            os.close(home_fd)
    except Exception as e:
        logger.error(f"Failed to remove public key: {e}")
        return False

cmd: